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Minority Rights and the
Union Shop: A Basis for
Constitutional Attack
Of the many basically private groups in this nation
possessed with sufficient power and influence to sub-
stantially affect the American economic and political
scene, certainly labor unions loom as some of the most
controversial and prominent. Private though such un-
ions may be, both the federal and state governments
have injected large scale authorization as well as restric-
tion into the activities of labor organizations. The author
of this article contends that the legislative and admin-
istrative inroads of control on this area constitute "gov-
ernmental" or "state" action which justifies the applica-
tion of the Constitution to the activities of labor unions.
Specifically, the author contends that the Taft-Hartley
Act's permissive allowance of the union shop is "govern-
mental action." Consequently, he states that the validity
of union activities in a Taft-Hartley union shop situa-
tion which affect the constitutional rights of individual
union members, particularly those activities which use
the dues of dissenting union members to support political
causes to which they are opposed, should be tested by
constitutional standards.
Frank T. Read*
It has been seriously suggested that .. . all or most 'powerful'
private groups should be subject to all or most provisions of the
Constitution. . . ."' Many writers have singled out the labor
union as an example of a private organization that most needs
to have constitutional restraints applied to it.2 More than a
few labor unions have grown to immense size and exercise vast
*Member of the Minnesota Bar.
1. Wellington, The Constitution, the Labor Union, and "Governmental
Action," 70 YAi L.J. 345, 346 (1961). [Hereinafter cited as Wellington, The
Constitution.]
2. See, e.g., Friedmann, Corporate Power, Government by Private Groups,
and the Law, 57 CoLUm. L. REv. 155, 176 (1957); Malick, Toward a New
Constitutional Status for Labor Unions: A Proposal, 9.1 Rocme MT. L. RnV.
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powers over workers, industries, and indeed the entire economy.
Currently one of the most controversial areas of labor man-
agement relations concerns the union security device known as
the union shop. Within 30 days after employment or within 30
days after a union shop contract becomes effective, an employee
must join the contracting union and tender the required dues
or lose his job.' Although the constitutionality of the union shop
itself under the Railway Labor Act4 has been attacked twice in
the United States Supreme Court,5 confusion is greater now than
ever before about the constitutional status of this union security
arrangement. Because of this current cloud of doubt hanging
over all union shop contracts, this paper will be concerned with
the threshold question that must be answered in the affirmative
before there can be any thoughts of applying the Constitution
to the union shop situation. Before the Constitution can be ap-
plied to any private group - whether it be labor union, corporate
enterprise, or the Gideon Society - a major obstacle must be
breached: Is there sufficient governmental involvement in the
questioned private activity to constitute the requisite "govern-
mental action" necessary to bring the Constitution into play?
If the Labor Management Relations Act's (Taft-Hartley Act's)
permissive allowance of union shop contracts0 amounts to suffi-
cient governmental or state action to justify application of the
Constitution to labor unions, serious questions arise as to whether
certain commonplace union activities infringe upon the individual
members' constitutional rights found in the first, fifth, and four-
teenth amendments.
For example, if an individual compelled to join a union shop
is then compelled to contribute dues which are used to support
political activities and ideas to which he is opposed, are the first
260 (1949); Miller, The Constitutional Law of the Security State, 10 STAw. L.
REv. 620, 655-56 (1958); Rauh, Civil Rights and Liberties and Labor Unions,
8 LAB. LJ. 874 (1957). Contra, Wellington, The Constitution 846-50, who
cites the above authorities, examines their arguments, and concludes that the
Constitution should not be applied to labor unions.
3. Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) (LMRA) § 8(a)(3),
61 Stat. 140 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1958); see SmrrH &
MmnuFIn, LABOR RELATIONS LAw 588-91 (9d rev. ed. 1960).
4. Section 2, Eleventh (a), 64 Stat. 1288 (1951), 45 U.S.C. § 152, Eleventh
(a) (1958).
5. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 867 US. 740 (1961); Rail-
way Employes' Dep't v. Hanson, 851 U.S. 295 (1956).
6. Sections 8(a)(3), (b)(2), 61 Stat. 140, 141 (1947), as amended, 9 U.S.C.
S§ 158(a)(8), (b)(2) (1958).
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and fifth amendment rights of that union member thus violated?
We will later be focusing on this particular problem in detail, but
it is wise to remember that this is only one of many constitutional
questions that could be raised over the union shop situation.
Another example is that when a man's religion forbids him to
join the union and yet he must join or lose his job, are his first
amendment guarantees of freedom of religion being violated?7
An analogous problem exists when the federal government au-
thorizes a union to act as exclusive bargaining agent and then
that union discriminates in excluding members on the basis of
race. Are these workers' fifth amendment rights being violated?*
I. GOVERNMENTAL OR STATE ACTION
It is well settled that the limitations on conduct contained
in the first and fifth amendments to the Constitution of the
United States are limitations on federal governmental conduct,
and not on private conduct.9 Therefore, if there is to be a viola-
tion of the guarantees contained in these amendments, the fed-
eral government must in some way be connected with the viola-
tion. Likewise, it has been clear since the Civil Rights Cases of
188310 that Congress cannot legislate under the fourteenth amend-
7. See Wicks v. Southern Pac. Co., 231 F.2d 180 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
851 US. 946 (1956); Otten v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 205 F.2d 58 (Rd Cir. 1953),
aff'd per curiam sub now. Otten v. Staten Island Rapid Transit Ry., 929 F.2d
919 (Rd Cir.), cert. denied, 851 U.S. 983 (1956) (union shop does not violate
constitutional rights of worker who refuses to join for religious reasons);
Blumrosen, Group Interests in Labor Law, 1 RueGERs L. REv. 432, 475-78
(1959); Wellington, The Constitution 854-56.
8. See, e.g., Rauh, supra note 2, at 875; Weiss, Federal Remedies for Racial
Discrimination by Labor Unions, 50 GEO. LJ. 457 (1962).
"The union's obligation under the . . . [Railway Labor Act] is to represent
fairly all employees -members and nonmembers, dissenters and advocates-
in the bargaining unit." Wellington, Machinists v. Street; Statutory Inter-
pretation and the Avoidance of Constitutional Issues, 1961 SUP. CT. RV. 49,
56 n.37. [Hereinafter cited as Wellington, Machinists v. Street.] See Steele
v. Louisville & N.R.B., 823 U.S. 192, 198 (1944), where Mr. Justice Stone
made it clear that if the statute in question had permitted discrimination,
then governmental action would have been present.
9. See Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323, 380 (1926); Talton v. Mayes,
168 U.S. 876, 882, 84 (1896); Withers v. Buckley, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 84,
89-91 (1857); Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). See also
Public Util. Comm'n v. Pollak, 848 US. 451, 461-69 (1952); Virginia v. Rives,
100 U.S. 818, 318 (1879).
10. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
1964] 9229
930 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:227
ment to prohibit private action." Only "state action" 2 of a
particular character is prohibited by the fourteenth amendment. 3
While private actions alone cannot be regulated or controlled by
application of the first, fifth, or fourteenth amendments, it has
become evident that "ostensibly private actions ... may occa-
sionally have a sufficient nexus with governmental action to
justify use of the Constitution as an instrument of control.""
Some modern scholars have adopted very expanded concepts
of governmental or state action. They contend that whenever a
government gives legal consequences to transactions between
private parties, there is governmental action, and that the real
11. The Supreme Court has in many cases applied the corollary rule that
the constitutional restrictions on state action apply to the manner in which the
state regulates legal relations between "private" parties. See Barrows v. Jack-
son, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); AFL v.
Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941); Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930);
Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915);
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366
(1898); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); Browder v. Gayle, 140 F.
Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala.), aff'd, 352 U.S. 903 (1956); see Hale, Rights Under
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments Against Injuries Inflicted by
Private Individuals, 6 LAw. Guiw REv. 627 (1946).
12. The terms "governmental action" and "state action" are often used
interchangeably and will -be so used in this Article. Specifically, however, the
term "governmental action" refers to sufficient involvement of the federal
government with the challenged action to invoke the first or fifth amendment;
the term "state action," on the other hand, refers to sufficient involvement of
a state government with the challenged action -to invoke the fourteenth
amendment.
13.
As to nation and state alike, the current controversies [concerning
"governmental" and "state" action] center on the application of the
guaranties respecting freedom, in one form or another. With refer-
ence to the federal power, there is the first amendment's prohibition
that Congress "make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press. . . ." More significant still, because of wider pos-
sibility of application, are the broad prescriptions of the fifth amend-
ment, "nor shall any person ... be deprived of ... liberty .. . without
due process of law . . . ," and the parallel prohibition against the states
contained in the fourteenth amendment. This wider applicability of
the fifth and fourteenth amendments arises from the fact that it is
liberty of all kinds, not merely of speech or of the press, that they pro-
tect, coupled with the doctrinal development whereby due process of
law means not merely compliance with established and decorous forms
of procedure but, as well, protection of "the very substance of indi-
vidual rights to life, liberty, and property" as against "arbitrary
legislation."
Merrill, The Three L's-Law, Labor, Liberty, 37 NOTRE DAME LAw. 589,
590-91 (1962). (Footnotes omitted.)
14. Wellington, The Constitution 345.
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question to be asked is not whether such action is present, but
whether it is constitutional or unconstitutional.'5 Nevertheless,
the traditional approach seems to make the decisive question
whether sufficient governmental action exists. In many cases it
has been assumed that the private action in question would be
unconstitutional if the Constitution were to be applied to it, and
the only real question is whether or not the Constitution is to
be applied.'
Before attempting to decide whether the Labor Management
Relations Act's permissive allowance of the union shop amounts
to governmental action, one needs to review quickly how the
concept of governmental action has expanded in the last few
years.' 7 Two decades ago a federal court of appeals declared that
"culpable official State inaction may also constitute a denial of
equal protection." 8 This idea that failure to act can still be gov-
ernmental action in aggravated cases was one of the first of many
new ideas that took root and flowered into the present rapidly
expanding conception of governmental action. Similarly, implicit
in the decision of Baker v. Carr,' where the Supreme Court held
that perpetuation by a state of serious malapportionment of
legislative districts which developed because of population shifts
violated the "equal protection" clause of the fourteenth amend-
15. See Horowitz, The Misleading Search for 'State Action' Under the
Fourteenth Amendment, So So. CAL. L. REV. 208 (1957); Williams, The
Twilight of State Action, 41 TEXAs L. Rnv. 347 (1963).
16. See ibid.
17. Williams, supra note 15, in giving a brief review, contends that the
concept of state action has in reality become all-pervasive. He claims that the
growth of state action since the Civil Rights Cases has taken place in four
directions: (a) the individual acting "under color of law" -citing, e.g., Mon-
roe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961); Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97
(1951); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945); United States v. Classic,
313 U.S. 299 (1941); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879); (b) the nonoffi-
cial individual or group acting so much under government authority as to be
viewed as engaging in state action-citing, e.g., American Communications
Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950); Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S.
192 (1944); (c) the concept of governmental refusal or failure to act as ful-
filling the requirement of state action-citing, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186 (1962); and (d) state action found in judicial enforcement of private
agreements and the supervision of private relationships -citing, e.g., Shelley
v. Kraemer, 384 U.S. 1 (1948).
18. Catlette v. United States, 132 F.2d 902, 907 (4th Cir. 1943). Defend-
ant, a deputy sheriff, had participated in infliction of indignities on Jehovah's
Witnesses and had failed to exercise the authority and duty of his office to
protect those citizens from group violence.
19. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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ment, was a finding of state action because of the failure of a
state to act to correct serious abuses.
In Marsh v. Alabamas0 can be seen the first clear articulation
of another new theory that when a state merely permits a private
body to carry out a traditionally public function, the state itself
has acted, and therefore, the actions of that private body will
be tested by constitutional standards. Mr. Justice Black stated
for the Court that:
the circumstance -that the property rights to the premises where the
deprivation of liberty, here involved, took place, were held by others
than the public, is not sufficient to justify the State's permitting a
corporation to govern a community of citizens so as to restrict their
fundamental liberties and the enforcement of such restraint by the
application of a state statute.2 '
This idea of "permissive" state action is seen again in Terry v.
Adams,2 2 where it was held that if a private organization performs
quasi-governmental functions such as holding primary or pre-
primary elections, though without state aid, its discriminations
will not be considered private.
Perhaps the best example of the expanding scope of the con-
cept of state action is restrictive covenant cases, starting with
Shelly v. Kraemer" where it was held that by reason of the four-
teenth amendment, no state court could enforce any private,
racially restrictive covenant. One of the most interesting recent
holdings is a per curiam decision that the Board of Directors of
City Trustees in Philadelphia, while exercising its obligation as
trustee to deny Negroes admission to the college created under
the will of Steven Girard, had engaged in state action proscribed
by the fourteenth amendment?'
One of the latest major state action cases decided by the
20. 326 U.S. 501 (1946). The managers of a private company-owned town
refused to permit a Jehovah's Witness to distribute religious literature in the
town. A State statute made it a crime to enter or remain on land after having
been warned by the landowner not to do so. A conviction of the Jehovah's
Witness under the statute was reversed by the Supreme Court on first and
fourteenth amendment grounds.
21. Id. at 509. (Emphasis added.) Horowitz, supra note 15, at 215, notes
a distinction between merely permitting a private party to discriminate and
compelling a private party to discriminate.
92. 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (fifteenth amendment).
23. 334 U.S. 1 (1948); accord, Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953)
(Shelley extended, no damages recoverable from home owner who broke racial
covenant); Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948) (racial restrictive covenants
not judicially enforceable in Washington, D. C.).
24. Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors, 353 U.S. 230 (1957).
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Supreme Court is Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority?" A
private restaurant refused service to a Negro. The restaurant
was the lessee of a parking authority set up by the city; it occu-
pied the corner of a large building that was used for parking
and owned by the city. The Court held that this discrimination
violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Several factors influenced its holding that requisite state action
was present: There was public ownership and dedication of the
building, the money for construction came from the public in
part, and the public paid the cost of maintenance and repair; the
areas leased were not surplus property of the State but rather an
integral part of an overall State plan; improvements that the
restaurant made which became a part of the realty were not taxed
to the restaurant, and the authority did not require in its lease
that the restaurant give service without discrimination?6 Mr.
Justice Clark, writing for the majority, stated that "the State
has so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with
[the restaurant] . . . that it must be recognized as a joint partici-
pant in the challenged activity. . . ."27 Clark further suggests that
by its "inaction," that State has placed its power, property, and
prestige behind the admitted discrimination. Some commentators
have complained that there is a source of doubt about the pre-
cedent value of the decision due to the Court's failure to identify
the particular act or omission upon which the State's constitu-
tional violation was predicated?8 But Justice Clark was
careful to make clear that only by a sifting of facts and circum-
stances can the non-obvious involvement of the State in private
conduct be given its true significance. Thus, it may fairly be pre-
dicted that when state action questions are decided in the future
25. 865 U.S. 715 (1961).
26.
[Ila its lease with [the restaurant] ... the Authority could have af-
firmatively required Eagle to discharge the responsibilities under the
Fourteenth Amendment imposed upon the private enterprise as a con-
sequence of state participation.... [No state may effectively abdicate
its responsibilities by either ignoring them or by merely failing to
discharge them . . . . By its inaction, the Authority, and through it
the State, has not only made itself a party to the refusal of service,
'but has elected to place its power, property, and prestige behind the
admitted discrimination.
Id. at 725.
27. Ibid.
28. See The Supreme Court, 1960 Term, 75 TAcRv. L. REv. 40, 144-47
(1961). Williams, supra note 15, contends that the Wilmington Parking Au-
thority case lays the foundation for abandoning the whole concept of state
action as it now exists.
1964] 233
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the Court will first indulge in a careful and detailed factual analy-
sis before rending its decision as to the existence or nonexistence
of state action.
An understanding of the growth of the concept of state action
in various areas can be more easily obtained when one realizes
that there is more than just the possibility that a rough pattern
is being followed.
State action cases involving such basic rights ... as voting and hous-
ing have followed a pattern of development. A discrimination statute
is first invalidated, only to be replaced by the same discrimination
ostensibly in private form. The Court has resolutely held to substance,
prohibiting the discrimination regardless of the agency producing it.
As a result, the language in the end decision of each sequence provides
a definition of state action sufficiently broad to cover almost any type
of human activity."
The most recent significant activity of the Supreme Court in
the governmental action area was the series of sit-in cases handed
down in the late spring of 1963. Peterson v. City of Greenvilles0
concerned the conviction of 10 Negro students under a South
Carolina trespass statute for refusing to leave an S. H. Kress
lunch counter at the request of the manager. The manager testi-
fled at the trial that he acted because of race, local custom, and
a city ordinance requiring racial segregation of eating facilities.
The city defended the convictions on the ground that they were
merely in aid of the store manager's private decision to discrim-
inate. The Supreme Court reversed holding that where legislation
commands an unconstitutional result - in this case segregation
of restaurants - the State "will not be heard" to assert that
the result was the product of a private individual's choice.
Whether the proprietor was, in fact, influenced by the ordinance
was deemed irrelevant since "the convictions [have] the effect
... of enforcing" the legislative command 3' In light of Peterson,
convictions in Gober v. City of Birmingham' were reversed and
Avent v. North Carolina 3 was remanded to the North Carolina
29. Clark, Charitable Trusts, the Fourteenth Amendment and the Will
of Steven Girard, 66 YAi L.J. 979, 982 (1957) (Footnotes omitted.); see id.
at 982 nn.13 & 14 for development of state action by cases. Many of the
cases are also collected in EMiEmso & HABm, PoLITIcAL AND CivI RIGHTS
IN THE UNTED STATES 993-1172 (1st ed. 1952); State Action- A Study of
Requirements Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 1 RACE REL. L. REP. 618
(1956).
30. 873 U.S. 244 (1963).
31. Id. at 248.
32. 373 U.S. 374 (1963).
33. 373 U.S. 375 (1963).
9.34
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Supreme Court which had erroneously assumed no segregation
ordinance existed in the City of Durham.
The most telling of the sit-in cases, insofar as advancement of
the concept of state action is concerned, was Lombard v. Louisi-
ana. 4 In that case the petitioners were convicted of "criminal
mischief" for refusing to leave a lunch counter on request. The
Supreme Court reversed on the basis of Peterson, holding that the
irrebuttable presumption of coercion by the State, announced in
that case, was dispositive even though there was present no local
ordinance requiring segregation as there was in Peterson. One
week before the arrests in Lombard, however, the Mayor and
Chief of Police of New Orleans issued proclamations deploring
sit-in demonstrations and promising to preserve the peace. These
executive utterances were interpreted as an "official command
... to direct continuance of segregated service in restaurants.
... ."3 The Court applied the Peterson presumption that the pro-
prietor had been coerced by officialdom. 6 State action has been
readily found in many other contexts where it was obvious to
the court that racial discrimination was being condoned.
In 1961, Mr. Justice Douglas, concurring in Garner v. Louisi-
34. 373 U.S. 267 (1963).
35. Id. at 973.
3o. The commentators in The Supreme Court, 1962 Term, 77 HARV. L.
REV. 62, 129 (1963), query "why an individual's right to invoke state assist-
ance in ejecting a Negro ought to turn on the fortuitous existence of an
unconstitutional statute or pronouncement." They state: "Such a touchstone
not only attaches significance to what is otherwise a legal nullity, but also
places the right to assistance at the mercy of legislative inertia and executive
intemperance." In summing up the importance of the sit-in cases on the doc-
trine of state action, Harvard comments that "the pressure exerted by the
existence of an estimated 7,500 sit-in convictions may, however, overcome
judicial resistance to doctrinal development and produce constitutional ven-
tures as enormous as that embarked upon in the areas of school segregation
and reapportionment." Id. at 131. (Footnotes omitted.)
37. See, e.g., Hampton v. City of Jacksonville, 304 F.2d 320 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 911 (1962), in which Negro plaintiffs sought an
injunction against private purchasers of city golf courses in restricting their
use to white persons. The deed from the city contained a reversionary clause
which provided that the land be used only as golf courses. The court held
that the reversionary clause was sufficient "complete control and interest"
making purchasers state agents, thereby making the discrimination state
action so as to deny equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the fourteenth
amendment. The qualified sale in Hampton was placed in the same category
as the lease involved in Wilmington. Compare Tonkins v. City of Greensboro,
175 F. Supp. 476 (M.D.N.C.), aff'd per curiam, 276 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1959),
in which the sale of a swimming pool owned by a city was complete and
therefore the new purchasers could do as they pleased.
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ana," indicated an immediate willingness to expand state action
far beyond even the most liberal opinion of the past." He reiter-
ated and expanded on this position in Lombard.4 0 One article
stated that if the Douglas expansion were adopted, the usefulness
of the concept of governmental action would be destroyed.4'
Despite the fears of this critic, the Supreme Court has never yet
held that state action extends to a state's "hands-off" policy -
"a policy which simply tolerates, without affirmatively encourag-
ing, the discriminatory practices of individuals or groups."4
Consequently, although it is evident that the class of activities
included under the rubric of governmental action has rapidly
grown in the last few years, the Court has never abandoned the
38. 368 U.S. 157 (1961). The majority released 16 Negroes whose only
alleged criminal activity was to sit in at white lunch counters. They did so
by failing to reach the constitutional question and merely saying 'the record
of conviction was totally void of any evidence that petitioners' acts caused
a breach of the peace. I
In his concurring opinion, id. at 176, Mr. Justice Douglas states that all
of the following have amounted to state action: 1) legislative enactments;
2) executive action; 8) administrative action of state agencies in leasing public
facilities; 4) judicial action; and 5) custom, practice and usage.
39. Mr. Justice Douglas states that all of the following are indicative of
state action: 1) the customs of Louisiana, reinforced by the State's legal
patterns, maintain racial discrimination; 2) the restaurant business (where
the sit ins occurred) is "affected with a public interest" and thus is subject
to the regulatory power of the State; and 8) the State through its municipali-
ties had licensed these restaurants.
40. Mr. Justice Douglas found the existence of the requisite state action
"wholly apart from the activity of the Mayor and police, for Louisiana has
interceded with its judiciary to put criminal sanctions behind racial discrim-
ination in public places." 878 U.S. at 278. Douglas further urges that any
business that is licensed by a governmental 'body should be required to serve
the 'public without discrimination.
41. Karst & Van Alstyne, Comment: Sit-Ins and State Action-Mr. Jus-
tice Douglas, Concurring, 14 STA. L. Rnv. 762, 776 (1962). See also Williams,
supra note 15, at 889, where it is suggested that the sun is setting on the
concept of state action as a test for determining the constitutional protection
of individuals. The author suggests that state action so permeates all activity
that it can be found in virtually all cases.
42. Wellington, The Constitution 351:
But a state policy of toleration is not, without more, state action
within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment. If it were, the
amendment would apply to the behavior of social fraternities, tennis
clubs, and clubs of all kinds. Indeed, most behavior would in the end
be state action for fourteenth amendment purposes. That no serious
suggestion of this kind has ever been raised is perhaps sufficient com-
ment on its undesirability. Since the Civil Rights Cases of 1888, the
Supreme Court -has consistently interpreted the amendment to restrict
its scope to an area of affirmative state action and a slight penumbrum
beyond.
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concept itself, and government action, therefore, must still be
shown before the Constitution can be applied.
II. THE DESIRABILITY OF APPLYING THE
CONSTITUTION TO LABOR UNION ACTIVITIES
It might be appropriate, before rushing headlong into a dis-
cussion of whether or not governmental action exists in relation
to the union shop, to contemplate a moment the results of apply-
ing the Constitution to the labor movement. While many com-
mentators have indeed proposed that constitutional safeguards
should regulate union activities,? other leading writers have
seriously questioned the desirability of such a move.44
When any important governmental policy is nomenclatured
"unconstitutional," frictions can and do result. The courts might
well be subject to strong complaint from the shocked friends of
labor, who have traditionally considered unions to be "private"
organizations, when they find union conduct is subject to the
vigorous standards of the Bill of Rights. To judge union conduct
by the Constitution would insert the federal judiciary into the
role of judge of all union activity, policy maker of labor manage-
See Comment, 26 Mo. L. REV. 510, 514 (1961). But of. Horowitz, supra note
15, at 221. Despite this categorical statement by Wellington some writers do
not agree that a state's "hands-off" policy does not amount to state action.
Professor Henkin suggests for a basis of state responsibility that "the state
is responsible for what it could prevent, and should prevent, and fails to
prevent." Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U.
PA. L. REV. 473, 483 (1962); cf. Gilbert, Theories of State Action as Applied
to the "Sit-In" Cases, 17 ARK. L. REv. 147 (1963).
43. See authorities cited note 2 supra.
44. Cox, The Role of Law in Preserving Union Democracy, 72 HARv. L.
REV. 609, 620 (1959):
It has also been argued that the powers which the NLRA vests
in labor unions are so far governmental that all their actions, including
the election and rejection of members, are subject to the restrictions
which the fifth and fourteenth amendments impose upon the federal
and state authorities. . . . In my opinion the reasoning is highly dan-
gerous. The implications of calling labor unions governmental instru-
mentalities are not easy to perceive, but surely the designation would
invite more and more regulation with consequent loss of independence.
See also Wellington, The Constitution 348:
The Bill of Rights and the fourteenth amendment are the great in-
struments with which courts protect the people from misused govern-
mental power. The view that because unions and corporations are
somehow similar to government they too should be restrained by these
same constitutional provisions has perhaps an aesthetic and emotional
appeal. Its analytical shortcomings, however, are fatal. The need to
regulate unions and corporations is undeniable; but it need not be
assumed a priori that the Constitution is the proper regulatory instru-
1964] 237
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ment relations, and organizer of internal union arrangements. If
the Supreme Court pronounced a constitutional decision concern-
ing some labor activity, it would be beyond the power of Congress
to change that decision by ordinary legislation. Is the Supreme
Court of the United States institutionally capable of assuming
this new duty at the very time when it is being buffeted by
criticism for "policy making" in areas traditionally avoided by
the judiciary? What would happen to congressional power to
control labor management relations that affect interstate com-
merce? Are there not other and better ways to regulate unions,
if they need regulating, than by applying the Constitution to
them?" The questions raised above should be kept in mind as
we search for state action in this area.
III. THE QUEST FOR GOVERNMENTAL ACTION
IN LABOR UNIONS
Labor unions have been traditionally considered to be private
organizations.4 Therefore, before the Constitution can be brought
to bear, a sufficient connection between the union and a govern-
ment has to be shown. As Professor Wellington states: "The
trick is to implicate the government in some way and make it a
partner to the union's deed."47
Having considered the general trend of cases toward expan-
sion of the concept of governmental action, and having raised
some questions concerning the desirability of judging union con-
duct by the Constitution, it is now time to consider the two cases
that directly bear on the problem of whether the allowance of
union shops by Congress constitutes the kind of governmental
ment. Other, more appropriate, means may be available to accomplish
the same desired ends.
45. Wellington, The Constitution 349, strongly urges that there are better
methods of regulating union conduct than by applying rigid constitutional
standards and suggests that if regulation is needed the obvious place to turn
is to Congress and the various state legislatures.
46. In American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 402 (1950),
the Supreme Court stated: "We do not suggest that labor unions which
utilize the facilities of the National Labor Relations Board become Govern-
ment agencies or may be regulated as such." But in Douds the Court was
also careful to point out that "power is never without responsibility. And
when authority derives in part from Government's thumb on the scales, the
exercise of that power by private persons becomes closely akin, in some re-
spects, to its exercise by Government itself." Id. at 401.
In National Fed'n of Ry. Workers v. National Mediation Bd., 110 F.2d
529 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 628 (1940), it was urged that a union
by utilizing the services of the National Mediation Board thereby became an
arm of the federal government, but the Court of Appeals refused to so hold.
47. Wellington, The Constitution 850.
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action that invokes constitutional standards.
A. Railway Employes' Dep't, AFL v. Hanson48
Employees of the Union Pacific Railroad brought suit against
that company and labor organizations representing various groups
of employees of the railroad to enjoin the application and en-
forcement of a union shop agreement signed by the railroad and
the labor organizations. The plaintiffs were not members of the
union and desired not to join the union but under the terms of
the union shop agreement all employees, as a condition of their
continued employment, had to join the union within 60 days.
These employees claimed that the union shop violated the "right-
to-work" provision of the Nebraska Constitution." The Nebraska
trial court issued an injunction and the Supreme Court of Ne-
braska affirmed.50 It held that the union shop violated the first
and fifth amendments of the United States Constitution and
therefore there was no valid federal law which could supersede
the "right-to-work" provision of the Nebraska Constitution. The
Supreme Court of the United States reversed holding that section
2, Eleventh of the Railway Labor Act (RLA),"5 which provides
that notwithstanding the law of "any state" a carrier and a labor
union may enter into a union shop agreement, was a valid exercise
by Congress of its power to regulate commerce.
Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for the majority in Hanson,
stated:
The union shop provision of the Railway Labor Act is only per-
missive. Congress has not compelled nor required carriers and employees
to enter into shop agreements. The Supreme Court of Nebraska never-
theless took the view -that justiciable questions under the First and
Fifth Amendments were presented since Congress, by the union shop
provision of the Railway Labor Act, sought to strike down inconsistent
laws in 17 States. . . . [Of. Otten v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 205 F.2d 58
(2d Cir. 1953); Hudson v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 242 N.C. 650,
89 S.E.2d 441 (1955).] The Supreme Court of Nebraska said, "Such
action on the part of Congress is a necessary part of every union shop
contract entered into on the railroads as far as these 17 States are
48. 351 U.S. 225 (1956), 42 A.B.AJ. 659 (1956), 19 GA. BJ. 550 (1957),
42 IowA L. REv. 113 (1956), 6 J. Pus. L. 263 (1957), 11 Sw. L.J. 88 (1957),
30 TrP. L.Q. 212 (1957); see Note, 15 VA=. L. REv. 1293 (1962).
49. NEB. CONST. art. xv, § 13:
No person shall -be denied employment because of membership in
or affiiation with, or resignation or expulsion from a labor organiza-
tion or because of refusal to join or affiliate with a labor organization;
nor shall any individual or corporation or association of any kind enter
into any contract, written or oral, to exclude persons from employment
because of membership in or nonmenthership in a labor organization.
50. Hanson v. Union Pac. R.R., 160 Neb. 669, 71 N.W.2d 526 (1955).
51. 64 Stat. 1238 (1951), 45 U.S.C. § 152, Eleventh (1958).
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concerned for without it such contracts could not be enforced therein."
160 Neb., at 698, 71 N.W.2d, at 547. We agree with that view. If
private rights are being invaded, it is by force of an agreement made
pursuant to federal law which expressly declares that state law is
superseded. . . . Cf. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 663 (1944).]
In other words, the federal statute is the source of the power and
authority by which any private rights are lost or sacrificed. . . . [Cf.
Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 198-99, 204 (1944).] The
enactment of the federal statute authorizing union shop agreements
is the governmental action on which the Constitution operates, though
it takes a private agreement to invoke the federal sanction.
As already noted, the 1951 amendment, permitting the negotiation
of union shop agreements, expressly allows those agreements notwith-
standing any law "of any State." § 2, Eleventh. A union agreement
made pursuant to the Railway Labor Act has, therefore, the impri-
matur of the federal law upon it and, by force of the Supremacy Clause
of Article VI of the Constitution, could not be made illegal nor viti-
ated by any provision of the laws of a State. . . .52
On the present record, there is no more an infringement or impair-
ment of First Amendment rights than there would be in the case of a
lawyer who by state law is required to be a member of an integrated
bar. It is argued that compulsory membership will be used to impair
freedom of expression. But that problem is not presented by this record.
Congress endeavored to safeguard against that possibility by making
explicit that no conditions to membership may be imposed except as
respects "periodic dues, initiation fees, and assessments." If other con-
ditions are in fact imposed, or if the exaction of dues, initiation fees,
or assessments is used as a cover for forcing ideological conformity or
other action in contravention of the First Amendment, this judgment
will not prejudice the decision in that case. For we pass narrowly on
§ 2, Eleventh of the Railway Labor Act. We only hold that the require-
ment for financial support of the collective-bargaining agency by all
who receive the benefits of its work is within the power of Congress
under the Commerce Clause and does not violate either the First or
the Fifth Amendments. We express no opinion on the use of other can-
ditions to secure or maintain membership in a labor organization oper-
ating under a union or closed shop agreement.53
Mr. Justice Douglas, therefore, explicitly found that govern-
mental action existed in Hanson. But the Court also refused to
pass on the first and fifth amendment claims of the plaintiffs. The
narrow holding was that Congress could justifiably find that it
promoted industrial peace to require all who benefited from a
union's collective bargaining efforts to pay for those efforts."
52. 351 U.S. at 231-32. (Emphasis added.)
53. Id. at 238. (Emphasis added.)
54. Prior to the decision in Hanson it was held that the 1951 amendments
to the RLA did not impair the constitutional rights of railroad workers, since
they did not authorize union shop contracts, but merely withdrew a prior
prohibition. Wicks v. Southern Pac. Co., 231 F.2d 130 (9th Cir. 1956); Cun-
ningham v. Erie R.R., 30 CCH Lab. Cas. 91687 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); Hudson v.
Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 242 N.C. 650, 89 S.E.2d 441 (1955); International
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A careful analysis of the reasons given by the Supreme Court
for a finding of governmental action in Hanson is absolutely nec-
essary to our discussion; it is also important to examine other
unmentioned factors that might have influenced the Court in its
finding of governmental action.55 Mr. Justice Douglas makes it
very clear that federal law did more than just tolerate the union
shop contract between the Union Pacific Railroad and the various
railroad unions in Hanson. Absent section 2, Eleventh of the Rail-
way Labor Act, the Nebraska Constitution would have prohibited
the union shop in Nebraska. Federal law ousted inconsistent state
law. Therefore the federal law, while permissive toward union
and management in letting them make up their own minds wheth-
er they want a union shop, is mandatory on the States once the
parties have decided they want this particular union security
device.
Professor Wellington suggests that the Court's stated reasons
for a finding of governmental action in Hanson could lead to
incongruous results.
In any given case the Court would 'have to look to state law to
decide whether there was sufficient federal involvement to hold the
private agreement to first and fifth amendment standards. Where state
law allowed the union shop, the parties could have achieved their pur-
poses without the federal enactment. Where this is the case the federal
statute in fact does no more than declare that the federal government
will "tolerate" the union shop on the railroads. And governmental
toleration will not sustain a finding of governmental action.56
Therefore under a strict reading of Hanson, if there is only gov-
Ass'n of Machinists v. Sandsberry, 277 S.W.2d 776 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1954);
Moore v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 26 CCK Lab. Cas. 87140 (City of Richmond,
Va. Hustings Ct. 1954).
After the Hanson case, the North Carolina Supreme Court, despite the
reservation of the constitutional issue in Hanson, found that the union shop
did not violate any minority worker's constitutional rights. Allen v. Southern
Ry., 249 N.C. 491, 107 S.E.2d 125 -(1959). Several other courts have also held
that section 2, Eleventh preempts the field. Sams v. Brotherhood of Ry. &
S.S. Clerks, 23s F.d 263 (4th Cir. 1956); Hudson v. Atlantic Coast Line
R.R., supra; Jarrett v. Southern Ry., 85 CCH Lab. Cas. 97623 (Oconee
County, S.C. Ct. Comm. Pleas 1958); Sandsberry v. International Ass'n of
Machinists, 156 Tex. 840, 295 S.W.2d 412 (1956); Moore v. Chesapeake & 0.
Ry., supra. The union shop amendments also take precedence over state con-
stitutions. Matter of Florida E. Coast Ry., 24 CCH Lab. Cas. 84373 (S.D.
Fla. 1953).
55. Wellington, The Constitution 355-60, gives a detailed and painstaking
analysis of the finding of governmental action in Hanson. He examines not
only the Court's stated reasons, but also proposes other theories that would
support a finding of governmental action. This textual discussion follows very
closely Wellington's arguments with a few excursions of my own.
56. Id. at 855. Wellington points out that Judge Learned Hand reached a
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ernmental action when an inconsistent state law is displaced, the
Constitution would apply in Nebraska; but in New York, in an
identical case, the Constitution would not apply because New
York law allows the union shop. Such a reading of Hanson, en-
tirely justified by the Court's language, reaches obviously un-
happy results.
A major policy behind having preemption rules in labor rela-
tions matters is to achieve uniform rules throughout the nation;
a strict reading of Hanson would conflict with this policy.7 Thus
could Hanson have meant something else? Maybe state law, as
such, "is irrelevant in determining whether there has been gov-
ernmental action."5 8 When Congress passed section 2, Eleventh,
state law became a matter of indifference; whether states now
have right-to-work laws or enact such laws in the future will
make absolutely no difference to railroads and railway unions that
want a union shop. One criticism of this interpretation is that
when a state law is consistent with the federal act, "the impact
of the federal statute is, in fact, zero. Only after a conceptual
somersault can the federal enactment be said to give rise to gov-
ernmental action."59
conclusion very like this in Otten v. Baltimore & ORR., 205 F.d 58 (2d
Cir. 1958), aff'd per curia= sub nom. Otten v. Staten Island Rapid Transit
Ry., 229 F.2d 919 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 983 (1956); accord, Wicks
v. Southern Pac. Co., 231 Red 130 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 946
(1956). The Otten case was an RILA case involving an employee whose re-
ligious beliefs would not allow him to join a union. Wellington states: "the
case is similar to Hanson, but it arose in New York where state law tolerates
the union shop. Therefore the Constitution had no application." Wellington,
The Constitution 356.
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid.
There is, moreover, an additional difficulty with the governmental-
action-arising-from-pre-emption interpretation of Hanson- that gov-
ernmental action automatically results when a congressional enactment
nullifies, or even confirms existing state law. It gives to federal govern-
mental action under the fifth amendment a meaning quite different
from the one the Court has given to state action under the fourteenth.
It means that unlike the states, the federal government in many situa-
tions may not explicitly adopt a "hands-off" policy. It means that all
private action taken under the authority of federal legislation that
occupies a field by that token alone becomes governmental action.
Therefore, the federal government must affirmatively outlaw private
behavior that conflicts with the standards applicable to it under the
fifth amendment. It is surely not self-evident that such a difference
between federal and state governmental action-a difference which
may or may not be desirable-is a by-product of the supremacy clause
and the doctrine of pre-emption. Those instruments of policy were
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It seems to the author, however, that this "pre-emption inter-
pretation" of the finding of governmental action in Hanson is
essentially sound. It is then immaterial whether state law is con-
sistent or inconsistent with federal law. Section 2, Eleventh
requires nationwide permissive allowance of union shop contracts
in the railroad industry regardless of the views of any particular
state.
Another theory might support the Supreme Court's finding
of governmental action in Hanson. Immediately after Mr. Justice
Douglas's statement that he agreed with the Nebraska Supreme
Court's finding of governmental action, he cited Smith v. All-
wrightco This is a "white primary" case and by its citation per-
haps the Court meant to infer that there is an analogy between
Hanson and the rationale that supported a finding of govern-
mental action in the white primary cases. In those cases the Court
seemed to hold that once a government has participated in an
activity, it is easy to find state action when a State attempts to
remove itself from that activity. However, Wellington insists
that the reasons the Government removed itself in Hanson and
the reasons the State removed itself in Smith v. Allwright were
different. "The difference ... is 'disengagement' for the purpose
of saving a state-instituted scheme of discrimination as contrasted
with 'disengagement' for a constitutionally inoffensive purpose."61
The issue, however, is whether the Railway Labor Act's allow-
ance of the union shop amounts to "disengagement" such as
constitutes governmental action. If the requisite governmental
action exists, then the union activities under the union shop
should be judged by the Constitution and the government's mo-
tive for disengagement is irrelevant.
The fourth and last major theory that would support the
finding of governmental action in Hanson is the one that would
most expand the concept, and it is the one that would most easily
support a finding that the Taft-Hartley Act's permissive allow-
ance of the union shop is governmental action. This theory points
out that the Railway Labor Act is but one segment of a compre-
hensive regulatory scheme. The railway unions have been given
immense control over the economic well-being of the bulk of the
fashioned to cope with problems unrelated to the question of when
constitutional restraints apply to the actions of private groups. One
must conclude that if the Court had meant to use the supremacy
clause and pre-emption to extend the concept of governmental action
in this novel way it should have given explicit consideration to the
problems involved.
60. 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
61. Wellington, The Constitution 358.
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employees in the railroad industry by federal legislation. This sug-
gests a delegation to the union of governmental power that may
not be unlike the situation of the company town in Marsh v.
Alabama."
To recapitulate, four theories have been discussed that could
support the finding of governmental action in Hanson: 1) the strict
reading that there is governmental action only because federal
law displaced inconsistent state law; 2) the reading that whether
state law is consistent or inconsistent with section 2, Eleventh,
is a matter of indifference because federal law has preempted the
field; 3) the Smith v. Allwright reading that once a government
has been actively engaged in any activity, disengagement is state
action; and 4) the interpretation that because of the extent of
federal legislation in the area, the unions have been delegated
the requisite degree of governmental power to bring the Constitu-
tion into play. "What emerges then, is that only a slight doctrinal
extension from existing case law is needed to bring the Constitu-
tion to bear on many kinds of activities now considered private.
Clearly, it is all that is needed doctrinally to bring the Constitu-
tion to bear on union conduct.""
It was natural after Hanson for a case to arise that did present
a record of impairment of first amendment rights. The stage was
set for Street.
B. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street"
A group of labor organizations and the carriers comprising the
Southern Railway System entered into a union shop agreement
pursuant to the authority of section 2, Eleventh of the Railway
Labor Act. The appellees brought this action on behalf of
themselves and employees similarly situated alleging that each
was compelled to pay money to hold his job which "was in sub-
stantial part used to finance the campaigns of candidates for
federal and state offices whom he opposed, and to promote the
propagation of political and economic doctrines, concepts and
62. 326 U.S. 501 (1946); see Wellington, The Constitution 360.
63. Ibid. Two courts that interpreted the RLA following Hanson were
uncertain about the reservation of the constitutional issue in Hanson. Hostet-
ler v. Railroad Trainmen, 287 F.2d 457, 459-60 (4th Cir. 1961); Allen v.
Southern Ry., 249 N.C. 491, 107 S.E.2d 125 (1959).
64. 367 U.S. 740 (1961). The appellate history of Street is as follows:
Rev'd dismissal of petition sub nom. Looper v. Georgia So. & Fla. Ry., 213
Ga. 279, 99 S.E.2d 101 (1957); International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street,
215 Ga. 27, 108 S.E.2d 796 (1959), probable jurisdiction noted, 361 U.S. 807
(1959), case set down for reargument because Attorney General of the Uiited
States not notified that constitutionality of a federal statute was in issue, 363
U.S. 825, decided, 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
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ideologies with which he disagreed."" The Superior Court of
Bibb County, Georgia, entered a judgment and decree enjoining
enforcement of the union shop on the ground that section 2,
Eleventh violated the first, fifth, ninth, and tenth amendments.
The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed holding that section 2,
Eleventh violated the first and fifth amendments of the federal
constitution. The United States Supreme Court reversed and
remanded.
The Supreme Court in the Street case split asunder on the
constitutional issues and on the statutory construction of section
2, Eleventh. Five different opinions were written. Each opinion
will be examined in detail.
Mr. Justice Brennan wrote the opinion of the Court. He frankly
admitted that "the record in this case is adequate squarely to
present the constitutional questions reserved in Hanson. These
are questions of the utmost gravity."" Nevertheless, he declined
to reach the constitutional issues: "[I]t is a cardinal principle that
this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute
is fairly possible by which the [constitutional] question may be
avoided." 7
The Court held that section 2, Eleventh could be construed
reasonably otherwise than to say that Congress meant to author-
ize a union to collect dues and use the dues, over an employee's
objection, to support causes to which the employee was opposed.
After an extensive examination of the history of rail unions and
65. 867 U.S. at 744.
66. Id. at 749.
67. Ibid. [Quoting from Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932).] The
best statement of the rule that constitutional issues are to be avoided by
statutory construction when possible is found in United Staes ex rel. Attorney
Gen. of United States v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 407-08 (1909):
It is elementary when the constitutionality of a statute is assailed, if
the statute be reasonably susceptible of two interpretations, by one of
which it would be unconstitutional and by the other valid, it is our
plain duty to adopt that construction which will save the statute from
constitutional infirmity. [Knights Templar's Indem. Co. v. Jarmon,
187 U.S. 197, 205 (1902)].. . . And unless this rule be considered as
meaning that our duty is to first decide that a statute is unconstitu-
tional and then proceed to hold that such ruling was unnecessary be-
cause the statute is susceptible of a meaning, which causes it not to be
repugnant to the Constitution, the rule plainly must mean that where
a statute is susceptible of two constructions, by one of which grave
and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the other of which
such questions are avoided, our duty is to adopt the latter. [Harriman
v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 211 U.S. 407 (1908)]....
See ROBERTSON & KmKHAM, JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES 487 (Wolfson & Kurland ed. 1951).
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their problems with union security clauses, Mr. Justice Brennan
declared that section 2, Eleventh was passed by Congress to force
all employees to share equally in the costs of negotiating agree-
ments and settling disputes. He stated that one looked in vain
for any suggestions that Congress also meant to allow unions to
force employees to support political causes which they oppose."
The Court took pains to point out Congress's concern with the
safeguarding of the right to dissent of the individual worker; the
Act was passed for the limited purpose "of eliminating the problems
created by the 'free rider.' "" The Court therefore concluded that
it should give to section 2, Eleventh a construction which
achieved both congressional purposes; unions should still be able
to eliminate the "free rider," but they should not be able to use
an employee's dues to support political causes which he opposes.70
After disposing of the interpretation problem, the Court was
faced with the difficult problem of forging a workable remedy that
would protect dissenters while not destroying the utility of the
union shop. The Court decided that a remedy would be given
only to those who had identified themselves as opposed to political
use of their funds, and even these dissenters were to get only the
amount of their dues that were used for political purposes re-
funded to them.71 U.S. Law Week reported that while the case
was being argued "most of the Justices seemed more concerned
about the nature of the decree than about the constitutional
issue ... ."72 Despite the Court's concern over devising a suitable
decree, the remedy finally formulated has invoked a storm of
criticism.73
68. 367 U.S. at 763-64.
69. Id. at 767.
70. Id. at 768-69.
71. On remand, the Georgia Supreme Court directed the trial court to
formulate a "fair, practicable, and convenient" method of computing the
amount of dues money expended by the unions for political purposes. How-
ever, if the trial court should be unable to formulate such a remedy, it was
directed to enjoin the unions from all political expenditures. The trial court
was also directed to cause notice to be posted that any employee who so
desires would be given the opportunity to intervene as a party plaintiff. The
unions moved for rehearing on the grounds that they were willing to allow
the plaintiffs to leave their union and recover their past dues, and that they
would not seek to have plaintiffs dismissed from their jobs. International Ass'n
of Machinists v. Street, 917 Ga. 351, 353, 122 S.E.2d 220, 222 (1961).
79. 28 U.S.L. W=mE 3313 (1960).
78. See Note, 61 CoLum. L. REV. 1513, 1518 (1961). "[The remedy in
Hanson] . . . will probably be of little practical significance, for the financial
burden of litigation is thereby imposed on individual dissenters who, even if
successful, will secure monetary recoveries so small as to be almost de mrni-
mis." Further, the lower courts will be faced with the vexing problem of
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The second opinion in Street was that of Mr. Justice Douglas,
concurring. He stated categorically that since neither Congress
nor a state legislature could abridge first amendment rights, they
cannot grant the power to private groups to abridge them.7 4 It
will be recalled that Vr. Justice Douglas wrote the majority
opinion in Hanson which found the existence of governmental
action and still upheld the Railway Labor Act. However, he points
out that the constitutional issue was expressly reserved in Hanson
and that the narrow and precise holding of Hanson was only
"that it was permissible for the legislature to require all who
gain from collective bargaining to contribute to its cost."75
Douglas concurred in the statutory interpretation of section 2,
Eleventh and in limiting relief to the six petitioners. He stated
that he recognized the strength of the arguments against propor-
tioned relief but concurred with the Court for the sake of a
majority.
Mr. Justice Whittaker concurred in everything the Court said
about the statutory construction of the Railway Labor Act but
dissented against the proportional relief granted. He believed
the only practical remedy was the one formulated by the Georgia
courts.
Mr. Justice Black dissented and strongly criticized the Court's
avoidance of the constitutional question.
I think the Court is once more "carrying the doctrine of avoiding con-
stitutional questions to a wholly unjustifiable extreme." . . . [H]istory
defining "political" disbursements-a task so complex that the Taft-Hartley
ban on political expenditures has never resulted in a conviction. United States
v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567 (1957), jury acquittal on remand, 41 L.R.R.M. 52
(1957); United States v. CIO, 385 U.S. 106 (1948); United States v. Painters
Local 481, 172 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1949) (dismissal); United States v. Anchorage
Cent. Labor Council, 193 F. Supp. 504 (D. Alaska 1961) (same); United
States v. Construction Local 264, 101 F. Supp. 869 (W.D. Mo. 1951) (same).
See generally Rauh, Legality of Union Political Expenditures, 34 So. CAL,. L.
Rnv. 152 (1961); Woll, Unions in Politics: A Study in Law and the Workers'
Needs, 34 So. CAL. L. Rv. 130 (1961).
Moreover, it is not clear whether the suggested remedy places the
burden of proof on the dissenting member or the unions. Even with the
accounting requirements of the Landrum-Griffin Act it will be extremely
difficult to trace the flow of dues through the local, state, and national
union and to prove that the political expenditures were made from dues
funds rather than voluntary contributions or income earned by union
property.
Note, 61 CoLien. L. Ruv. 1513, 1518 (1961). In addition "it is clear that
the expense of securing restitution will exceed the value of that remedy, so
that even if it is not circumvented, the remedy will be unsatisfactory to the
protestant." The Supreme Court, 1960 Term, 75 Hav. L. REV. 40, 238 (1961).
74. 367 U.S. at 777.
75. Id. at 776.
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shows that Congress with its eyes wide open passed that section, know-
ing that its broad language would permit the use of union dues to
advocate causes, doctrines, laws, candidates and parties, whether indi-
vidual members objected or not. Under such circumstances I think
Congress has a right to a determination of the constitutionality of the
statute it passed, rather than to have the Court rewrite the statute in
the name of avoiding decision of constitutional questions. . . .7
[N]o one has suggested that the Court's statutory construction of § 2,
Eleventh could possibly be supported without the crutch of its fear of
unconstitutionality. 7
After Mr. Justice Black reached the constitutional issue, he found
section 2, Eleventh to be unconstitutional.
There can be no doubt that the federally sanctioned union-shop
contract here, as it actually works, takes a part of the earnings of some
men and turns it over to others, who spend a substantial part of the
funds so received in efforts to thwart the political, economic and ideo-
logical hopes of those whose money has been forced from them under
authority of law. This injects federal compulsion into the political and
ideological processes, a result which I have supposed everyone would
agree the First Amendment was particularly intended to preventj
Mr. Justice Frankfurter also dissented in an opinion joined
by Mr. Justice Harlan. First Justice Frankfurter lashed the
majority's avoidance of the constitutional question." It is inter-
esting to note that both the two oldest justices, Black and Frank-
furter, would have reached the constitutional issue. However,
having reached the constitutional issue, Frankfurter's opinion
was diametrically opposed to Black's.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter felt that the constitutional issue raised
in Street was for all practical purposes decided in favor of the
76. Id. at 784-85.
77. Id. at 786.
78. Id. at 789. (Emphasis added.)
79.
And so the question before us is whether § 2, Eleventh of the Railway
Labor Act can untorturingly be read to bar activities of railway unions,
which have bargained in accordance with federal law for a union shop,
whereby they are forbidden to spend union dues for purposes that
have uniformly and extensively been so long pursued as to have become
commonplace, settled, conventional trade-union practices. No considera-
tion relevant to construction sustains such a restrictive reading.
Id. at 800.
The aim of the 1951 legislation, clearly stated in the congressional
reports, was to eliminate "free riders" in the industry - to make pos-
sible "the sharing of the burden of maintenance by all of the benefi-
ciaries of union activity." To suggest that this language covertly
meant to encompass any less than the maintenance of those activities
normally engaged in by unions is to withdraw life from law and to
say that Congress dealt with artificialities and not with railway unions
as they were and as they functioned.
Id. at 801.
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validity of section 2, Eleventh in the Hanson decision.80 After
examining the claims of the petitioners and weighing them against
the congressional policy evidenced by section 2, Eleventh, Frank-
furter concluded that "this is too fine-spun a claim for consti-
tutional recognition." 8'
Interestingly enough, after Justices Frankfurter and Harlan
had already rejected the constitutional claims of the plaintiffs,
they then raised the problem of governmental action. These two
justices were the only members of the Court even to suggest that
there was no governmental action because of the "permissiveness"
of section 2, Eleventh. Therefore, it is necessary to quote at some
length from their arguments:
But were we to assume, arguendo, that the plaintiffs have alleged
a valid constitutional objection if Congress had specifically ordered the
result, we must consider the difference between such compulsion and the
absence of compulsion when Congress acts as platonically as it did, in
a wholly non-coercive way. Congress has not commanded that the
railroads shall employ only those workers who are members of author-
ized unions. Congress has only given leave to a bargaining representa-
tive, democratically elected by a majority of workers, to enter into a
particular contractual provision arrived at under the give-and-take of
duly safeguarded bargaining procedures. . .. Congress itself emphasized
this vital distinction between authorization and compulsion. S. Rep.
No. 2262, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 2. And this Court in Hanson noted that
"The union shop provision of the Railway Labor Act is only permissive.
Congress has not . . . required carriers and employees to enter union
shop agreements." 351 U.S., at 231. When we speak of the Government
"acting" in permitting the union shop, the scope and force of what Con-
gress has done must be heeded. There is not a trace of compulsion
involved -no exercise of restriction by Congress on the freedom of
the carriers and the unions. On the contrary, Congress expanded their
freedom of action. Congress lifted limitations upon free actions by
parties bargaining at arm's length.82
Finally Mr. Justice Frankfurter warns: "This Court would
stray beyond its powers were it to erect a far-fetched claim, de-
rived from some ultimate relation between an obviously valid
80.
The record before the Court in Hanson clearly indicated that dues
would be used to further what are normally described as political and
legislative ends. And it surely can be said that the Court was not
ignorant of a fact that everyone else knew. Union constitutions were
in evidence which authorized the use of union funds for political
magazines, for support of lobbying groups, and for urging union mem-
bers to vote for union-approved candidates. . . . One would suppose
that Hanson's reasoning disposed of the present suit.
Id. at 804-05.
81. Id. at 806.
82. Id. at 806-07.
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aim of legislation and an abstract conception of freedom, into a
constitutional right.""
Because of the proliferation of opinions, it would be wise to
try to summarize the positions of all nine justices on the major
issues involved. Five justices agreed that section 2, Eleventh did
not authorize the expenditure of union dues for political purposes
(the Brennan four and Mr. Justice Whittaker). Five agreed on
the issue of proportional relief (the Brennan four and Mr. Justice
Douglas, dubitante). Seven justices thought some relief should
be granted and said that their opinions cast grave doubt on the
constitutionality of a statute which would authorize expenditures
of a dissenting employee's dues for political purposes (the Bren-
nan four, and Justices Black, Douglas, and Whittaker). Only two
justices expressed the view that the statute would be constitu-
tional (Frankfurter and Harlan). And only two justices verbally
cast doubt on whether the permissive character of the statute
created the necessary governmental action to bring the Consti-
tution to bear on the union shop situation (Frankfurter and
Harlan)."
The Street case has received wide attention; its importance
has been argued" and its conclusions have been discussed and
attacked from all sides." The restrictive interpretation of the
Railway Labor Act to avoid constitutional problems has espe-
cially been the source of a torrent of criticism.87 If the Court had
construed section 2, Eleventh of the Railway Labor Act as per-
mitting the union to compel membership and the payment of
88. Id. at 812.
84. A similar breakdown is made in Note, 24 GA. B.J. 482 (1962).
85. The N.Y. Times, June 92, 1961, p. 30, col. 4, stated that "few durable
conclusions can be drawn from the decision," and the majority opinion was
characterized as a "free-wheeling interpretation of the Railway Labor Act."
One author went so far as to suggest that "stripped of all its disguises, the
Street case . . . emerges as simply another attack on the validity of the union
shop; and the issues it raises are neither novel nor particularly significant."
Aaron, Some Aspects of the Union's Duty of Fair Representation, 22 Omo
ST. L.J. 39, 63 (1961).
86. The Street case has been extensively noted by legal periodicals. See,
e.g., 48 A.B.AJ. 81 (1962); 28 Bnooi L. REv. 170 (1961); 61 CoLum. L.
REV. 1513 (1961); 24 GA. B.J. 432 (1962); 75 HARv. L. REV. 238 (1961); 18
MERCER L. Rnv. 439 (1962); 56 Nw. U.L. REV. 777 (1962); 36 ST. Joan's L.
REv. 164 (1962); 1961 SUP. CT. REv. 49; 1961 U. ILL. L.F. 526; 64 W. VA. L.
REV. 220 (1962).
87. The following is but a sampling of the reaction of commentators to
the avoidance of the constitutional problem. "[I]t is almost certain that ...
Congress in 1951 was fully conversant with the political activities of the rail
unions that were exerting pressure on it to legalize the union shop." The
Supreme Court, 1960 Term, 75 HLAv. L. Rev. 40, 285 (1961).
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dues with no restriction as to the expenditure of such dues (thus
allowing the union to expend funds for political purposes) - the
most obvious construction - serious constitutional issues would
have had to be met. The threshold question that would have
faced the Court was whether or not the execution and enforce-
ment of a union shop agreement involved governmental action.
C. AwALYsis AND CoMPAMRsoN oF Hanson AND Street
On the surface the fact situations, with the exception of the
more explicit pleading of the constitutional issues in Street, were
substantially the same in Hanson and Street. It would seem
an easy matter to find governmental action in Street in the same
manner it was found in Hanson. Both States had right-to-work
laws -but the important difference was that the Nebraska
right-to-work law in Hanson did cover the railroad industry and
the Georgia right-to-work law in Street did not cover the railroad
industry. As far as this writer has been able to ascertain this
extremely important factual difference has been overlooked by
every commentator but one, and he mentions it in a footnote."
The Georgia "right-to-work" law provides in the definitional
section that
(a) the term "employer" includes any person acting in the interest
of an employer, directly or indirectly, but shall not include the United
States, or any State, or any political subdivision thereof, or any person
subject to the Railway Labor Act, as amended from time to time ... .8
If this provision means that the railroad industry in Georgia was
not subjected to the right-to-work law of Georgia, as this writer
believes it does, then there was no State law or State created right
that section 2, Eleventh could have displacedV0 Therefore in
Street, if the Court had reached the constitutional issues, the
first question it would have had to decide would have been
[I]t seems that anyone with knowledge of prevailing practices of unions
at the time the statute was enacted . . . would be compelled to conclude
that Congress must have known that unless specifically prohibited
from doing so, the unions would spend a substantial part of the col-
lected dues for political purposes.
Note, 24 GA. BJ. 432, 436-37 (1962). "The question of the use of funds for
political purposes received almost no attention when Congress in 1951 re-
versed itself and permitted the union shop on the railroads." Wellington,
Machinists v. Street 59. 61 CoLTem. L. REV. 1513 (1961), contains an excellent
summary of what Street held with an analysis of the opinions of the justices;
the author states, "the majority of the Court embraced a strained statutory
construction to avoid a constitutional question that should have been de-
cided." Id. at 1517.
88. The Supreme Court, 1960 Term, 75 HARv. L. REv. 40, 236 n.939 (1961).
89. GA. CODE Auw. § 54-901(a) (1961). (Emphasis added.)
90. Resolution of this issue would have been complicated by the fact that
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whether governmental action was involved in the execution or
enforcement of a union shop contract in a state with no applicable
right-to-work law. This issue was certainly not resolved by Han-
son. Despite the fact that the Hanson case is certainly distinguish-
able on the governmental action point, interestingly the majority
opinion of the Court in Street seemed to have assumed that
governmental action was present in Street.9 The Court was
straining to avoid the constitutional issues - a tortured construc-
tion of section 2, Eleventh was accepted for the very reason that
the constitutionality of the statute was seriously in doubt. If it
is not to be assumed that the Court felt that the requisite gov-
ernmental action was present, it is difficult - if not impossible -
to explain why the Court did not hold that there was no govern-
mental action present. Such a holding would have solved the
majority's problems because no further constitutional issues would
need to have been reached. If this writer's above reasoning is cor-
rect, then Wellington's contention "that if we had a 'hands-off'
state policy and a permissive federal statute combined in one
case, no substantive constitutional question would be presented,
for no governmental action - state or federal - could be
shown"O2 is erroneous. It is this writer's considered opinion that
the Georgia right-to-work law's express exemption of industries
covered by the Railway Labor Act from its provisions squarely
presents the case mooted by Wellington. There was a state
"hands-of" policy and a permissive federal statute and yet it can
be safely assumed that seven members of the Supreme Court felt
that the requisite governmental action was present to invoke the
Constitution.
If we are correct in assuming that most of the justices on the
Supreme Court would have found governmental action if they
had reached the constitutional issue, it becomes necessary again
to suggest theories that support the existence of governmental
action. The strict reading of Hanson that governmental action
exists only if inconsistent state law is displaced could not be
utilized. But the more liberal interpretation of Hanson - that
once it was clear the federal act preempted the field, then the
laws of the various states become a matter of indifference -
would certainly explain a finding of governmental action in Street.
the trial court had found union shops to be contrary to the Constitution,
law, and public policy of Georgia in spite of the express exemption of the
railroad industry from the Georgia right-to-work law. Looper v. Georgia So.
& Fla. Ry., 36 CCH Lab. Cas. 65463, 65466-68 (Ga. Super. Ct. 1958).
91. See 367 T.S. at 749-50; The Supreme Court, 1960 Term, 75 HAIny. L.
REV. 40, 236 n.939 (1961), for the same opinion.
92. Wellington, The Constitution 354.
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The last two theories discussed above in connection with Hanson
could also be applied to the Street situation. The analogy to
Smith v. Allwright,93 the white primary case in which the Court
seemed to hold that "disengagement" after a state had been
actively involved in an area could amount to state action, would
also apply just as easily to Street. Finally, the last idea - that
the unions have been given such a great amount of control over
railway employees by federal legislation that in essence there is
a delegation of government power - could also be utilized in
Street. In connection with this last theory, it is interesting to note
various reasons urged by counsel for the dissenting union mem-
bers in Street to support a finding of governmental action:9 4
1) [governmental action] ... arises from the unions' statutory author-
ization, comparable to "legislative" power, to bind unwilling minorities
to a collective contract ... ;O5 2) it results from an electoral process
absolutely and unreviewably controlled by a federal agency . . ;96 3) [the
union shop] . . . effectuates a governmental policy . . ;9 4) [govern-
mental action] ... results from government-imposed duties and powers
of the union to bargain with the employer; 5) the government itself inter-
vened, through the National Mediation Board and a presidential Emer-
gency Board, to encourage if not compel the signing of the union shop
contract; and 6) the contract depends on federal tribunals for its
enforcement. . . .8
Consequently, it is evident that many reasons could be urged
on the Court to support a finding of governmental action if the
Supreme Court is ever forced to face the constitutional issues in
a sufficiently analogous case.
D. SEQUEL TO Street
The United States Supreme Court has recently taken one more
crack at the issue presented by Hanson and Street under the Rail-
way Labor Act. In the case of Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks
v. Allen,o" the Court, while not disturbing the substantial holding
in Street, did attempt to clarify the remedies available to dissent-
93. 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
94. See a summary of Brief for Appellees, International Ass'n of Machinists
v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961), in 6 L. Ed. 2d 1554 (1962). (Footnotes added.)
95. Citing American Communications Assn v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950),
and Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
96. Citing Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944), and Switchman's Union
v. National Mediation Bd., 320 U.S. 297 (1943).
97. Citing Railway Employes' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
98. Citing Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago R. & I.R.R., 353
U.S. 30 (1957); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); Slocum v. Delaware,
L. & WR.R., 339 U.S. 239 (1950); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948);
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
99. 373 U.S. 113 (1963).
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ing union members. 0 The holding in Street, that section 2, Elev-
enth denies a union the power over an employee's objection to
use his exacted funds to support political activities to which he
is opposed, was expressly reaffirmed. Mr. Justice Brennan, writing
for the majority of the Court, agreed with the trial court that it
would be impractical to require the plaintiffs to list and prove
each distinct union expenditure to which he objects; he stated
that it was enough that a plaintiff object to expenditures for
any political purposes. The Supreme Court, however, did not fol-
low the trial court on the formulation of the remedy available
to the dissenting employees. The remedy of injunction was held
to be improper because it was too broad and might interfere with
performance by unions of those functions and duties which the
Railway Labor Act places upon them to obtain the goal of
stability in the industry. The Court then discussed possible
remedies. It suggested an injunction against expenditures for
the political purposes opposed by each dissenter - such expendi-
tures being an amount equal to so much of the moneys exacted
from the employees as is the proportion of the union's total budget
spent for political purposes - and restitution of such sums al-
ready exacted from the employees and expended by the union
over their objection.'"' Mr. Justice Black concurred on the basis
of his opinion in Street. Mr. Justice Harlan concurred in part
and dissented in part; he wanted dismissal of the action in its
entirety on the basis of Lathrop v. Donohue'02 because of a lack
100. Briefly the Allen case involved a suit by
a group of nonunion railroad employees ... in ... North Carolina
... to enjoin enforcement of a union-shop agreement entered into
between a railroad and several unions under § 2, Eleventh, of the
Railway Labor Act . . .. The complaint alleged that sums exacted
under the agreement "have been and are and will be regularly and
continually used" to fmance political activities "directly at cross-
purposes with the free will and choice of the plaintiffs." A jury made
separate findings that moneys . . . were used . . . [to support] purposes
not . . . necessary . . . to collective bargaining, including political activi-
ties. The trial court enjoined the unions
from compelling the plaintiffs to join a union or pay any dues; nevertheless,
the trial court further provided that when the union showed what portion
of its dues were used for collective bargaining it could charge the plaintiffs
that portion of the dues. The North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the
trial court by reason of an equally divided bench. The United States Supreme
Court reversed and remanded. Ibid.
101. It is still unclear as to what type of expenditures fall into classes
from which members may dissent. 48 MuM. L. REv. 635 (1964). See also 49
A.B.AJ. 1011 (1963).
102. 367 U.S. 820 (1961). (Discussed in text accompanying notes 138-47
infra.)
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of specificity as to what exactly each employee objected to.
The Allen case does not affect our previous analysis of the
Street case nor the many sound theories that can be urged as
support for a finding of governmental action in the union shop
situation.
IV. DOES THE TAFT-HARTLEY ACT'S PERMISSIVE
ALLOWANCE OF THE UNION SHOP CONSTITUTE
GOVERNMENTAL ACTION?
The Taft-Hartley Act amended section 8(a) (3) of the National
Labor Relations Act to read:
Provided, that nothing in this Act, or in any other statute of the United
States, shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with a
labor organization ... to require as a condition of employment mem-
bership therein on or after the thirtieth day following the beginning
of such employment or the effective date of such agreement, whichever
is the later . .. .103
This section of Taft-Hartley is remarkably similar in language,
and seemingly in purpose, to section 2, Eleventh of the Railway
Labor Act.'04 The major difference is that the union shops in the
railroad industry are permitted "notwithstanding any ... law ...
of any State."1oa Whereas section 14(b) of the National Labor
Relations Act as amended by Taft-Hartley provides that:
Nothing in this Act shall be construed as authorizing the execu-
tion or application of agreements requiring membership in a labor
organization as a condition of employment in any State or Territory
in which such execution or application is prohibited -by State or Terri-
torial law.'oo
Therefore the only major difference in the two acts is that under
Taft-Hartley states can have a right-to-work law and under the
103. 61 Stat. 140-41 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. M§ 158(a)(3) (1958).
104. Union and carrier may negotiate an agreement:
requiring as a condition of continued employment, that within sixty
days following the beginning of [their] employment . . . all employees
shall become members of the labor organization .. . provided, that no
such agreement shall require such condition of employment with re-
spect to employees to whom membership is not available upon the
same terms . . . as are generally applicable to any other member or
with respect to employees to whom membership was denied or ter-
minated for any reasons other than failure of the employee to tender
the periodic dues, initiation fees, and assessments (not including fines
and penalties) uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retain-
ing membership.
Railway Labor Act, § 2, Eleventh, added by 64 Stat. 1238 (1951), 45 U.S.C.
§ 152, Eleventh (1958).
105. Ibid.
106. Labor Management Relations Act § 14(b), 61 Stat. 151 (1947), 29
U.S.C. § 164(b) (1958).
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Railway Labor Act they cannot. Despite this difference, it is fair
to surmise that Congress in section 2, Eleventh was attempting
to do no more than roughly conform the law of union security
in the railroad industry to that in industries regulated by Taft-
Hartley 07
Because of the great similarity in the union security provisions
of the Taft-Hartley Act and the Railway Labor Act, it is confi-
dently predicted that it will not be long before a dissenting em-
ployee asserts that Taft-Hartley's allowance of the union shop
is unconstitutional for the same reasons that the unconstitu-
tionality of the Railway Labor Act was asserted in Hanson and
Street.0 s However, it will be much more difficult for the Court to
avoid the constitutional issue in a Taft-Hartley Act case. As it
was, the Supreme Court was accused of engaging in a strained
interpretation'o when it decided that Congress did not mean to
authorize a union to spend the dues of a dissenting employee for
political purposes in Street. It will be almost impossible for the
Court to similarly interpret the Taft-Hartley Act to avoid con-
stitutional issues. The history of Taft-Hartley indicates little
congressional interest in protecting the rights of employees
who object to use of their funds for political purposes to which
they are opposed."o However, history of congressional interest
in the rights of dissenting employees was strongly relied on by
the Court in Street to avoid deciding the constitutionality of rail-
road union shops."' Other crutches used by the Court in Street
to support its restrictive interpretation of section 2, Eleventh will
not be as persuasive when the Taft-Hartley Act case arises.112
107. Wellington, Machinists v. Street 59-60.
108. See Wellington, Machinists v. Street 70; 64 W. VA. L. REv. 220, 223
(1962).
109. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 784-86
(1961) (Black, J., dissenting), 61 COLUM. L. REv. 1518, 1517.
110. What little discussion there is about the use of employee dues under
a union shop arrangement for political purposes is sparse and disorganized.
See, e.g., Hearing on S. 55 Before the Senate Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 796-808, 1004, 1425, 1687, 2145 (1947); Hear-
ings on H.R. 8 Before the House Committee on Education and Labor, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. 850 (1947).
111. 367 U.S. at 765.
112. See Wellington, Machinists v. Street 70:
It will not be long before a dissenting employee asserts that the Taft-
Hartley's union shop is unconstitutional. When that happens it will be
difficult indeed for the Court to read Taft-Hartley in the way in which
it has read the Railway Labor Act. As we have seen, it cannot be said
that in 1947 Congress was cutting back on a freedom it had earlier
granted dissenting employees. Nor can it be asserted that unions regu-
lated by Taft-Hartley had traditionally been uninterested in union se-
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Consequently, when a dissenting employee raises the constitu-
tionality of the union shop under the Taft-Hartley Act, the Court
will in all likelihood be faced inescapably with deciding the con-
stitutional questions involved. And, of course, the first question
that will present itself is whether the union shop allowed by Taft-
Hartley is infected with governmental action which will support
the application of the first and fifth amendments of the Con-
stitution.
The union shop allowed by the Taft-Hartley Act is permissive
only, and it expressly does not preempt state right-to-work laws.
Therefore, can it be contended that section 8(a)(3) of Taft-
Hartley infects the union shop with governmental action? Woll
contends that whenever the Supreme Court has held or suggested
that certain actions of private groups are subject to constitu-
tional limitations, there has been present one of three crucial
elements: xx 1) the private body was exercising a basic state
function -usually with affirmative cooperation of the state;11 4
2) the private body was invoking affirmative state action by
seeking judicial enforcement or recognition of a private con-
tract;115 3) "the private body had derived its power to act in a
particular capacity or engage in a specific activity, usually mo-
nopolistic or exclusive, by virtue of a statute, and was regulated
in the exercise of this power by governmental authority.""e Woll
places the Hanson finding of governmental action under number
three, above, because the union shop was allowed despite state
law to the contrary. This writer believes it is possible to find all
curity. These propositions were made by the Street majority about con-
gressional performance in 1951, and about unions regulated by the
Railway Labor Act. They were advanced by that majority as weighty
reasons for its reading of section 2, Eleventh. They are not available as
bases for reaching a like conclusion in a Taft-Hartley case. The consti-
tutional questions left unresolved by Street will yet have to be resolved
by the Court.
118. Woll, supra note 73, at 138. This article contains an excellent dis-
cussion of whether the union's expenditure of funds for political purposes is
private or governmental action.
114. Citing two primary election cases, Terry v. Adams, 845 U.S. 461
(1953), and Smith v. Allwright, 821 U.S. 649 (1944), and the company-town
case, Marsh v. Alabama, 826 U.S. 501 (1946).
115. Citing Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); Shelley v. Kraemer,
384 U.S. 1 (1948). Both of these cases also had elements of number one, dis-
cussed in the text immediately above, because private groups were trying to
regulate zoning.
116. Woll, supra note 73, at 139, cites, as well as Hanson, Steele v. Louis-
ville & N. Ry., 823 U.S. 192 (1944), in which the bargaining representative
had to represent all members of the unit without discrimination-constitu-
tional problems would have arisen if discriminatory representation were pos-
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three of Woll's elements in a Taft-Hartley Act case. It could be
contended that because of the power unions derive from federal
labor legislation they have in a sense been delegated a basic state
function. If a union defended the legality of section 8(a) (3), which
most certainly it would do if its activities under a union shop
contract were challenged, then federal judicial enforcement might
raise Shelley v. Kraemer type governmental action. And lastly it
could be contended that most certainly a union received its power
to act as exclusive bargaining agent by means of federal legisla-
tion and that federal legislation regulated this power. An ex-
tremely strong argument could be built up for a finding of
governmental action just by the vast amount of federal legisla-
tion concerning organized labor." 7
The strongest argument of all, of course, for a finding of gov-
ernmental action in a Taft-Hartley case is simply because the
Supreme Court expressly found that governmental action existed
in Hanson, and seven members of the Court probably assumed
it existed in Street. To the dissenting employee who is compelled
to join a union, the situation is exactly the same under the Rail-
way Labor Act or under Taft-Hartley. It is a matter of indiffer-
ence whether the compulsion arises from a permissive federal act
that displaces a few right-to-work laws or a permissive federal
act that tolerates a few right-to-work laws.118 It is this writer's
opinion that the general trend toward expansion of the concept
of governmental action, plus the express finding of governmental
action in Hanson and the implication of governmental action in
Street, will result also in a finding of governmental action in a
Taft-Hartley Act case.
V. SHOULD THE CONSTITUTION BE APPLIED TO THE
UNION SHOP SITUATION?
"Responsibility and power over federal labor policy shifts
from Congress to the Court when union conduct is judged by
the Constitution.""19 As previously indicated many commenta-
tors are deeply concerned over the institutional capabilities of
the Supreme Court to handle the problems it would face if the
sible under the statute. He also cites Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343
U.S. 451 (1952), saying "in a non-labor case, governmental action existed
because a public transport utility had been specifically permitted by a gov-
ernment commission to operate radio programs on its buses."
117. See statutes listed in Railway Employes' Dep't, AFL v. Hanson, 851
U.S. 225, 238-S9 (1956).
118. See Wellington, The Constitution 369.
119. Id. at 861.
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constitutional questions concerning the union shop are solved
the way Mr. Justice Black would have solved them in Street."o
Reconciling the public interest in the union shop as an instrument of
industrial stability and the union's right as a collective bargaining agent
to further legislation in which it has a legitimate interest with the
union members right not to be compelled to support political views
that he opposes is a complex and highly political problem. It necessarily
requires investigation and regulation more appropriately conducted -by
the legislature than by the courts. A holding that political expenditures
of union dues is constitutional, which is certainly supportable, would
have withdrawn the Court from much of its involvement in this area
and might have encouraged Congress to determine whether remedial
legislation is warranted.' 2 '
Wellington contends that the union shop should not be regu-
lated by the Constitution for several reasons. 22 The two reasons
that he urges most strongly 'are: 1) The Court would do a bad
job because it is institutionally unfit; and 2) no existing doctrine
would compel the Court to test union action by constitutional
standards. Needless to say, this writer disagrees with Wellington's
second reason - present legal doctrine would point to a decision
that the union shop was touched with sufficient governmental
action. The core of Wellington's objections are found in his first
reason, above.2s He feels the Court is structurally unqualified to
make policy decisions concerning the need for a union shop:
If the Court, within the analytical framework of union activity as
governmental action, is to decide whether this use of funds by the union
contravenes the first amendment, it would seem that the Justices must
consider several factors: on the one hand are to be weighed the uses
and purposes to which the money is to be put, the importance of the
objectives in question to the labor organization, and the extent to
which they are supported by the majority within the organization, and
on the other hand there is to be assessed the impact of the union's
action on the dissenting employee. As noted, this means the Court's
immersion in the history, structure, and aspirations of the union move-
ment, and of the particular union. In short, it means immersion in
collective bargaining, and an understanding of the relationship between
economic power and political action.124
One frequent objection to the Court's judging the union shop
by constitutional standards is that it would force the Court to
decide which expenditures are for political purposes and which
are not. Of course, the Court's avoidance of the constitutional
issue in Street by statutory interpretation still requires the Court
120. See, e.g., Wellington, The Constitution; The Supreme Court, 1960
Term, 75 HAnv. L. REv. 40, 23 (1961).
121. 61 CoLum. L. REv. 1513, 1518 (1961).
129. Wellington, Machinists v. Street 71-72.
123. Wellington, The Constitution 363-64.
124. Id. at 864.
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to decide what portion of the dues were used for "political pur-
poses."'25 Only avoidance of the constitutional issue by failure to
find the requisite governmental action, or a square holding in
favor of unlimited expenditures of dissenting employee's dues for
political purposes will keep the Court from the labyrinth of decid-
ing what purpose is political and what purpose is not.
Wellington calls all those who would have the Court regulate
union conduct by the Constitution "bold thinkers,""* and pre-
dicts that such a holding would be opening a Pandora's box."'7
In spite of Wellington's warning, this writer still feels that it
would not be an unwarranted extension of existing doctrine to
apply the Constitution to the union shop. 28 Wellington has real
fear not only that the Court is institutionally unfit to apply the
125. See 36 ST. JoNr's L. REv. 164, 168 (1961).
126.
The easy conclusion, shared by too many "bold thinkers," that
"whenever any organization or group performs a function of a suffi-
ciently important public nature, it can be said to be performing a gov-
ernmental function and thus should have its actions considered against
the broad provisions of the Constitution" is wrong. Like most easy
conclusions about most hard governmental problems it lacks the insti-
tutional feel. Perhaps there are private groups in society to which the
constitution should be applied. But one thing is clear: that conclusion
should depend on more than an awareness that the group commands
great power or performs a function of an important public nature.
With respect to labor unions one should ask: (1) What is the pres-
ent state of the law? (2) Where will an extension of doctrine lead?
(3) Can nonconstitutional law be used to solve the problem? and (4)
Can and will Congress solve these problems-and solve them better
than the Supreme Court? The answer to these four questions yields
one conclusion: union conduct should not now be regulated by the
Constitution of the United States.
Wellington, The Constitution 374.
127. He contends that the kind of confusion which followed the Court's
construction of section 301(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act would follow. Labor
Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) J 301, 61 Stat. 156 (1947), as
amended, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1958). Compare Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills,
353 U.S. 448 (1957), with Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 348 U.S. 437 (1955). See Bickel & Wellington,
Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71
Hav. L. Rzv. 1 (1957) for an interesting discussion of the problems imposed
on the federal judiciary by the Lincoln Mills holding that the federal courts
were to create a body of substantive federal law to apply to the enforcement
of labor management contracts.
198. Contra, Wellington, Machinists v. Street 72-73:
[I]t would require an extension of existing doctrine, doctrine contained
in the landmark cases of Shelley v. Kraemer, Smith v. Allwright, and
Terry v. Adams, to permit such a result. While an extension of this
doctrine to cover union action would not be an illogical development
of constitutional law, it would . . . be a plainly unwise development.
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Constitution to unions, but also that policy making powers re-
served by the Constitution for Congress are being usurped. 2 9
Notwithstanding these impressive arguments from Wellington
and others, the Constitution prohibits congressional legislation
that infringes on first and fifth amendment rights, and it is logical
to say that section 8(a)(3) of Taft-Hartley represents such gov-
ernmental action - therefore the Supreme Court is faced with
the duty of testing union activities under the union shop by
constitutional limitations.
VI. WHEN THE CONSTITUTION IS APPLIED TO THE
UNION SHOP - WHAT RESULT?
"Who does not see that 'the same authority which can force
a citizen to contribute three pence only of his property for the
support of any one establishment, may force him to conform to
any other establishment in all cases whatsoever.' "130 This state-
ment of James Madison is quoted along with a similar one by
Thomas Jefferson'' in Mr. Justice Black's dissent in Street.m
The first and fifth amendment rights of citizenship are indeed
precious. The right of free speech and association contained in
the first amendment are as dear to a dissenting worker in a union
shop as to any other citizen. And certainly it cannot be claimed
that the Supreme Court, both in Hanson and in Street, has not
been painfully aware of the dangers of making political freedom
"overly subservient to general group welfare under the guise of
sharing the cost burden."1sa
Nevertheless, despite the strong constitutional arguments that
can be raised on behalf of the dissenting employee, it must be
kept in mind that the majority workers in a union shop have
constitutional rights also. Unions have, since their inception, been
as interested in politics as they have been in the closed shop or
the union shop.'3 4 Opposition or support of proposed legislation
- such as a wages and hours bill or a statute to outlaw the
union shop - which directly affects a union's strength "is clearly
129. Wellington, The Constitution 366; Wellington, Machinists v. Street
61-62.
180. WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 186 (Hunt ed. 1901).
131. Thomas Jefferson, in his 1779 Bill for Religious Liberty, declared
"that to compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation
of opinions which he disbelieves is sinful and tryannical." 2 BRANT, JAMES
MADISON, THE NATIONALIsT 854 (1948).
182. 367 U.S. at 790.
183. Note, 36 ST. JoHn's L. REv. 164, 171 (1961).
184. See Brief for the AFL-CIO as Amicus Curiae, pp. 14-28, Interna-
tional Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
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'germane' to collective bargaining."5 Attempts to curb the politi-
cal activity of unions have generally been noted for their lack of
success.13 Organized labor feels that it too has the right to claim
"freedom of speech." In a complex society a single voice is often
drowned out in the din of the crowd; only when single voices unite
and speak as one have they a chance of being heard. Labor feels
that it must speak as an entity or its views will not be respected
- and to speak as an entity requires money. The union treasuries
of necessity must be looked to for support of important causes
in which labor has a vital stake. Therefore, when the Supreme
Court faces the constitutional challenge that will be made on the
union shop in Taft-Hartley Act industries, it will be faced with
weighing and balancing the competing claims of the union as an
entity against those of the individual dissenting worker. Perhaps
the dues of the minority worker which are spent on causes to
which he objects will be held to cause only a "negligible decrease
in the net effectiveness of the dissenters' political strength." 37
Then again perhaps the right of the dissenter will be held to out-
weigh those of the union in the union shop context. Therefore,
even when the Supreme Court has concluded that the requisite
government action exists to test the union shop by the Constitu-
tion, its decision on the merits will, by no means, be an easy one.
The difficulty of deciding the constitutional issue on the merits
and the divergency of views that can be expected in the Court
itself is illustrated by the decision in Lathrop v. Donohue,"s
135. Brief for the United States, p. 32, International Ass'n of Machinists
v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961). Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated:
When one runs down the detailed list of national and international
problems on which the AFL-CIO speaks, it seems rather naive for a
court to conclude-as did the trial court-that the union expendi-
tures were "not reasonably necessary to collective bargaining or to
maintaining the existence and position of said union defendants as
effective bargaining agents." The notion that economic and political
concerns are separable is pre-Victorian.
367 U.S. at 814.
136. See Rauh, Legality of Union Political Expenditures, 34 So. CAL. L.
REV. 152 (1961). The author contends that LMRA § 304, 61 Stat. 136, 159
(1947), and which is now 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1958) of the Criminal Code, is a
dismal failure because labor unions have an historical role to play in all
political activity.
137. The Supreme Court, 1960 Term, 75 HIAnv. L. REv. 83, 236 n.939
(1961). Merrill, The Three L's-Law, Labor, Liberty, 37 NoIRE DAMaE LAW.
589, 600 (1962) states that the freedom of expression issue is completely
irrelevant to the constitutional validity of compulsory organizational mem-
bership.
138. 367 U.S. 820 (1961).
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handed down the same day as Street.19 Although the purpose of
this Article does not include a determination of the constitution-
ality of various activities under the union shop or a prediction
as to the outcome of such a case in the Supreme Court, the
Lathrop case is interesting and instructive in relation to the
present discussion.
The plaintiff in Lathrop sued to recover dues paid to the
Wisconsin State Bar. The plaintiff contended that an order of
the Wisconsin Supreme Court integrating the state bar was un-
constitutional on the ground, among other things, that it violated
the fourteenth amendment. The United States Supreme Court
could not agree on an opinion, although six members of the Court
(Brennan, joined by Warren, Clark and Stewart - and Harlan
joined by Frankfurter) did agree that a state may constitu-
tionally condition the right to practice law upon membership in
an integrated bar association. There was no state action problem
because the order of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin was held
to be a statute. In the Court's opinion, if you can call it that,
Mr. Justice Brennan held that the membership requirement was
limited to compulsory payment of reasonable annual dues and
therefore the order did not impinge on protected rights of associa-
tion. He held the issue of free speech was not ripe because the
record did not show what the petitioner was opposed to, nor
what percentage of his money was used for that purpose.4 o Mr.
Justice Harlan contended that all constitutional issues were ripe
for decision and that the integration order was valid. Mr. Justice
Whittaker held the Constitution was not violated when a lawyer
had to pay a reasonable fee for the privilege of practicing law.
Mr. Justice Black, joined by Mr. Justice Douglas, held that the
constitutional question should have been decided and that to take
the compulsory dues of a lawyer and use them for things to
which he was opposed violated the first amendment. Mr. Justice
Douglas further contended that the State has no power to compel
all lawyers to join a guild. 41 In viewing this indecisive decision,
189. June 19, 1961.
140. A comment in 48 Manu. L. REv. 685 (1964), expresses the opinion
that the holding in Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks v. Allen, 878 U.S. 113
(1963), discussed in text supra, that it was impractical to require each plain-
tiff there to prove each distinct minor expenditure to which he objected,
overrules Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820 (1961), on this point.
141. Interestingly enough Mr. Justice Douglas wrote the majority
opinion in Hanson and used the analogy of the integrated bar to uphold
the union shop. Now in Lathrop he states, "in the Hanson case we said, to
be sure, that if a lawyer could be required to join an integrated bar, an
employee could be compelled to join a union shop. But on reflection the
analogy fails." 367 U.S. at 879.
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Mr. Justice Black stated, "I do not believe that either the bench,
the bar or the litigants will know what has been decided in the
case- certainly I do not."'2
The important thing about Lathrop v. Donohue, for our pur-
poses, is the extremely close analogy between it and the Street
and Hanson opinions. In Street itself, Mr. Justice Frankfurter
comments: "The present case is, as the Court in Hanson asserted,
indistinguishable from the issues raised by those who find consti-
tutional difficulties with the integrated bar."*4 3 Mr. Justice Black
agreed with Mr. Justice Frankfurter that the constitutional issues
in Lathrop and Street were the same.'" In both Street and Lathrop
"the complaint is against being compelled to contribute money
that will be used to support causes opposed by the contributor;
and it is this element of compulsion that is the real common
denominator."4  It is said that the constitutional question in all
three cases - Hanson, Street, and Lathrop - is simply whether,
in order to practice his livelihood, an individual may be compelled
to join and pay money to an organization which financially sup-
ports political causes to which he is opposed."' Street and Lath-
rop, coupled with the earlier decision in Hanson, occupy the
whole arena of the Court's consideration of the "freedom from
association." 4 7
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court of the United States in the near future
is going to be squarely faced with the question of whether or
not the Taft-Hartley Act's permissive allowance of the union
shop contract amounts to sufficient governmental action to sup-
port a claim alleging that compulsory payment of union dues
that are used to support political purposes to which an individual
is opposed violates the first and fifth amendments. It is predicted
that the Supreme Court will find that the necessary governmental
nexus exists to apply the Constitution to the union shop in Taft-
Hartley industries. Once it is clear that the Constitution can be
142. 367 U.S. at 865.
143. 367 U.S. at 809.
144. Id. at 785. 28 U.SL. WEF= 8313 (1960) asserts that in the oral
arguments before the Court in Street the justices argued much about the
analogy between the union shop and the integrated bar.
145. Aaron, Some Aspects of the Union's Duty of Fair Representation,
22 Omo ST. LJ. 39, 58-59 (1961).
146. 64 W. VA. L. REV. 220-21 (1962).
147. Comment, Freedom from Political Association: The Street and
Lathrop Decisions, 56 Nw. U.L. REv. 777 (1962). See also 64 W. VA. L. REV.
220 (1962).
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used to test section 8(a) (3) of the Taft-Hartley Act, then the
continued validity of that statute in operation is greatly in doubt.
Cogent arguments can be made by dissenting employees that
section 8(a)(3) violates their constitutional rights. Likewise,
strong arguments can be raised by the unions as to the rights
of the majority to speak as an entity. What the decision will be
when made on the constitutional merits is beyond the scope of
this article and probably impossible to predict. If the Supreme
Court should hold section 8(a) (3) unconstitutional, and this is
not such a remote possibility, the reverberations of such a deci-
sion would rival those following the school integration cases of
1954 and the apportionment decision of 1962.

